Hypnotic Ss received posthypnotic suggestions (a) to begin all sentences to the ostensible experimental (Taffel) task with "he" and "they," and (b) to be unaware of and amnesic for this fact. Waking simulator Ss received identical suggestions preceded by instructions to behave later as though they had been hypnotized when they received the suggestions. During a postexperimental inquiry with a different E, 8 of 14 hypnotic Ss were amnesic for their experimental behavior; none of the 13 simulating Ss were amnesic (p < .0005). All simulating Ss testified that their use of "he" and "they" was voluntary; the reverse was true for 12 of 14 hypnotic Ss (p < .00005). The results of this experiment demonstrate that hypnotic behavior is not wholly reducible to acting in accordance with demand characteristics, and suggest that there is a "state" of hypnosis within which suggestions have a peculiarly potent effect.
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Most investigators interested in hypnosis believe that there is an hypnotic state which fundamentally differs from the waking state (As, 1963; Erickson, 1944 Erickson, , 1952 Marcuse, 1959; Orne, 1959; Shor, 1960 , Weitzenhoffer, 1953 , 1957 , 1963 White, 1941) . If there is a state of hypnosis, it would seem that there ought to be manifestations unique to it; yet nearly all of its purported behavioral indices have turned out to be spurious and/or evincible by procedures other than those traditionally termed hypnotic (Orne, 1959; Barber & Calverley, 1962 , 1964a Barber & Hahn, 1962; London & Fuhrer, 1961) .
It is the contention of the present investigator that the search for behavior unique to the hypnotic state is understandable but somewhat misguided, and furthermore, that unequivocal demonstration of the existence of an hypnotic state is in no way contingent upon a demonstration that certain behaviors are unique to it. It may well be that almost any behavior, however bizarre, that is elicited from a somnambulist can be duplicated by a waking person providing only that (a) he is privy paper is based on a doctoral dissertation submitted to the Department of Psychology at the University of Illinois. The author wishes to thank the thesis chairman, William Gilbert, for his continued support and guidance on this project, and John Williamsen for his untiring aid and helpful suggestions.
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to information concerning how and in what manner he is supposed to behave, and (b) the stakes for a successful performance are high enough. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that equivalent behavior obtained from simulator and hypnotic subjects is a sufficient basis for inferring an equivalence in their state, that this inferred state-equivalence casts doubt upon the reality of the hypnotic as distinct from the waking, motivated state, and that therefore "the concepts of 'trance' and 'hypnosis' may no longer be useful . . ." [Barber & Calverley, 1962, p. 388] . It is here claimed that any inference to equivalent states from equivalent behavior must ultimately devolve upon the conditions under which similarities of behavior are obtained (Weitzenhoffer, 1963) . It is moreover claimed that the control conditions of many previous hypnotic experiments demonstrating no difference between hypnotic and simulating subjects disallow any such inference.
The effect of demand characteristics and expectancies (by whatever name) on hypnotic behavior seems to be widely acknowledged (Erickson, 1944; Orne, 1959; Sidis, 1906) , but their effect on the behavior of simulating controls has not been equally appreciated. As a result, simulators are often differentially exposed to procedures which inform them of what constitutes "hypnotic" behavior and/or which communicates the investigator's expectancy that the simulator should behave in a prescribed, hypnoticlike fashion in order to make the experiment a success (e.g., Barber & Calverley, 1963, Experiment I; Orne, 19S9) . These kinds of instructions are generally termed motivating instructions-and no doubt they do enhance motivation; but they do so in part by altering the experimental demand characteristics and the subject's expectancies of how he is to behave. Most subjects in an experiment will ordinarily behave in a way commensurate with what they feel is expected of them (Orne, 19S9, 1962) ; to explain motivated control subjects' behavior with reference to motivation only thus seems to be misleading and inaccurate. By contrast, hypnotic subjects are often told just to let happen whatever happens without attempting to help or hinder the operator. Similar behavior elicited from subjects in each of these two groups could quite obviously occur for two different reasons. The present investigator submits that selectively providing only the simulating subjects with expectancies eventuating in behavior comparable to that evinced by hypnotic subjects confounds the effects of trance variables on one hand, and demand characteristics and expectancy variables on the other. Such a confounding disallows any inference that task-motivated and hypnotic conditions are equivalent in essence as well as in effect.
Inasmuch as the influence of demand characteristics has proven to be ubiquitous for experimental subjects in general (Orne, 1962; Orne & Scheibe, 1964) , the fact that control simulators will respond to them is not at all surprising. The strategy of the present experiment takes advantage of this fact and focuses on a slightly different question, namely: will hypnotic subjects respond to an alteration in demand characteristics (in the same way that simulators do) when so responding is opposed by previously administered, posthypnotic suggestions?
Through the use of posthypnotic amnesia, the present experiment will attempt to demonstrate that the effects of demand characteristics and trance variables are distinguishable. The following two working assumptions are made: (a) that in general, a simulator subject's failure to verbalize presumably amnesic material or to justify previous behavior is a direct effect of a group of variables subsumed under the rubric "demand characteristics," and that subsequent and appropriate manipulations of the demand characteristics can dispose such a subject to verbalize what he remembers; (b) that an hypnotic subject's "amnesic" and "nonjustifying" behavior is a direct effect of some variable other than demand characteristics and that subsequent manipulations of demand characteristics designed to elicit recollections or justifications from such a subject will fail in their aim. This "other" variable responsible for an inability to remember or to justify behavior is assumed to be somehow related to an altered state of the subject like that ostensibly induced by hypnosis. Let this be called the trance variable.
The above two assumptions have focused on two aspects of a subject's behavior: a failure to verbalize, which is referable to some presumably amnesic state of the organism, and the presence or absence of justifying behavior. The latter notion requires some further elaboration. For the purposes of this study, a person who justifies his previous behavior is one who claims that the behavior in question was performed voluntarily; a person who does not justify prior behavior either denies or does not admit the occurrence of the behavior, or claims that it was performed involuntarily. It seems reasonable to suppose that the presence or absence of the volitional quality of experience is related to the presence or absence of the altered state ostensibly induced by hypnosis (Austin, Perry, Sutcliffe, & Yeomens, 1963; Erickson & Erickson, 1941; Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960) .
The dependent variable of this experiment was subjects' verbal reports collected in an ostensibly postexperimental inquiry consisting of standardized questions about the apparent experimental (Taffel s ) task. Use of "The Taffel task (Taffel, 1955 ) is a task originally utilized in verbal conditioning experiments. The only equipment consists of a series of 3 X 5 index cards on each of which appears (in different order on each card) the personal pronouns I, he, she, you, we, and they. A different past tense verb is located above the pronouns on each card. The sub-subjects' postexperlmental reports as the dependent variable has been suggested previously by Orne (19S9) and Barber and Calverley (1962) , and it has been utilized in a modified form by Fisher (19S4) and Austin et al. (1963) .
The hypotheses to be tested are as follows:
I. There will be a positive relation between the hypnotic condition and a failure to verbalize the use of "he" and "they" in a postexperimental inquiry.
II. Fewer hypnotic subjects than simulating subjects will justify their use of "he" and "they" on the Taffel task during a postexperimental inquiry.
METHOD Subjects
The subjects were selected from a volunteer group of approximately 450 undergraduate women at the University of Illinois, most of whom were enrolled in an introductory course in psychology. Some of the subjects were enrolled in more advanced psychology courses, and a very few of them heard about the experiment from friends and volunteered their services. Subjects from this group were selected for the initial phases of the experiment on the basis of a score earned on the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility (Shor & Orne, 1962) . Subjects who passed 8 items (including the posthypnotic amnesia item) out of 12, and who expressed a willingness to do further individual work in hypnosis were seen for 1 or 2 more sessions during which training and practice in attaining deep hypnosis were given. During these training sessions, no specific suggestions of posthypnotic amnesia were administered. The purpose of this deletion was to minimize later effects of subjects' expectancies concerning this phenomenon on the eventual dependent variable.
After the training sessions 10* out of the 12 items of the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale Form C depth scale (Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962) were administered to each subject. A score of 7 or more was considered criterial. After both screening procedures were completed, 37 subjects remained. Eight subjects served in pilot work; 29 were run in the final study. Subjects were randomly distributed into an experimental hypnotic group (hypnotic subjects), and a control, simulating group (simulating subjects). One of the simulating subjects was highly deviant in her performance to the Taffel task, so her ject is asked to make up sentences to the index cards, always beginning each sentence with one of the pronouns, and using the verb as the predicate. 4 The posthypnotic amnesia item was deleted for reasons outlined in the text. The arm rigidity item was deleted because it was consistently utilized as an initial warm-up suggestion for all subjects in their individual training sessions. responses to the inquiry procedure were not analyzed. The data of another subject were lost due to a breakdown of the recording equipment.
Procedure
The general strategy of the experiment was to manipulate the experimental situation so as to elicit a "confession" from most simulating subjects concerning their voluntary use of "he" and "they," and then to see how identical procedures affected the hypnotic subjects. It was not so easy as it might seem to elicit remembering and justifying behavior from a highly susceptible, hypnotically trained subject who was consciously committed to playing the role of a posthypnotic subject. Despite the difficulties, however, a four-stage procedure was evolved that consistently resulted in the desired "confessions" by the pilot simulating subjects. This procedure was subsequently applied to the hypnotic subjects and simulating subjects in the main study as outlined below:
I. At the beginning of the final (third or fourth individual) meeting, the hypnotist (Experimenter 1) turned on the portable tape recorder which was on his desk in full view of the subject. (This was standard procedure for all of the individual practice sessions as well.) He then hypnotized the subject by means of the arm levitation technique with the suggestion that the subject would be more deeply asleep than she had ever been before by the time her hand touched her face. Experimenter 1 then read suggestions to the sleeping hypnotic subject stating in effect that (a) she would always begin sentences to a task, soon to be presented, with what was being called the correct response, that is, with either "they" or "he"; (ft) that she would be unaware of this fact "just as you are unconscious of your rate of breathing or the fact your eyes blink," and (c) that upon awakening, she would neither remember nor be reminded of any of these suggestions. The hypnotic subject was then awakened and introduced to Experimenter 2, who presented the ostensible, experimental task. Experimenter 1 was absent from the room at this time. The simulating subjects were treated exactly the same way except that prior to the reading of the above hypnotic suggestions, they were awakened and read the following instructions:
In a moment ... I am going to read you exactly the same instructions hypnotized subjects are read . . . and later on I want you to pretend as though you had been hypnotized when you were read the instructions, and act just like you think the subject who had been hypnotized would act under the circumstances. Do you understand? Fine. Here are the instructions.
II. Experimenter 2, who was ignorant of the group to which any particular subject belonged, first administered standard instructions for the Taffel task. Twenty-nine instead of the usual 80 cards were presented. After the subject completed the Taffel task, Experimenter 2 presented 2 MAPS pictures. The subject was asked to make up S sentences to each of the 2 pictures. After the subject completed the 10 sentences, Experimenter 2 left the office and Experimenter 1 re-entered.
III. Experimenter 1 sat down behind the desk and switched off the tape recorder on his desk. Simultaneously, through the use of a foot-pedal control, he switched on another tape recorder hidden from the subject's view in a large desk drawer. This machine thus provided verbatim records of the subsequent (Part IV) inquiry procedure. He then announced to the subject, "Well, the experiment is over. Do you have any questions about it?" No matter what the subject said, Experimenter 1 eventually worked the conversation around to the point where he could say without apparent irrelevance:
The purpose of the experiment was to see if the way subjects make up sentences to the index [Taffel] cards has an influence on the way they make them up to the [MAPS] pictures. And the reason I had a third person administer the task is because theoretically at least I could have unwittingly biased the responses in the way I wanted them to come out.
The reason for turning off the mock tape recorder, announcing that the experiment was over, and providing the subject with a raison d'etre for the experiment was to alter the situation in such a way that it would no longer be perceived as experimental in nature. It was assumed that such an alteration would reduce, if not eliminate altogether, a subject's further need to perform successfully (Barber, 1962) .
The subject was allowed to make any final comments, and just before she stood up, Experimenter I, in an apparently spontaneous but actually standardized fashion, asked the subject if she could talk to another person (Experimenter 3) for a moment. This person was purportedly doing pilot research in an experiment concerning verbal behavior and had expressed interest in talking to Experimenter 1's subjects. After Experimenter 1 had made appropriate explanations to the subject and had extracted her permission to be interviewed by Experimenter 3, Experimenter 1 said, "And listen, since we're all finished here, I want you to be completely honest with him, regardless of what I've said before." The purpose of the italicized portion of Experimenter 1's "closing speech" was to convince the subject that Experimenter 1 wanted her to tell everything to Experimenter 3 she could remember, despite any suspicions she might have had about whether the experiment was in fact over. Thus, two factors were operating to promote the subject's "confession" concerning her use of "he" and "they." First, the experiment was declared to be over, thereby removing an experimental subject's normal tendency to perform successfully from that point on. Secondly, a new and different demand was established to the effect that the subject was to be honest despite any previous instructions.
IV. Experimenter 3, on any given occasion, did not know in advance of his interview with a subject whether she was an hypnotic subject or a simulating subject. Experimenter 3 was introduced to the subject, thanked her for giving him a few extra moments, and acknowledged his good fortune in being able to use Experimenter 1's subjects as part of his pilot data. In a conversational manner, Experimenter 3 then asked the subject a series of standardized questions embedded in a matrix of irrelevant questions and comments designed to minimize the subject's suspicions. There was no attempt to adhere to a specific schedule, and the conversation proceeded in what appeared to be a spontaneous fashion. Experimenter 3 did not discourage subjects from spontaneously elaborating answers or asking questions. When Experimenter 3 did ask the pertinent questions, however, he asked them in order and in their standarized form insofar as the circumstances allowed. These interview sessions were tape recorded, and the kind of responses that the subjects gave, judged in terms of the criteria presented below, served as the dependent variable of this study. The standardized questions follow:
(a) Tell me, how did you go about making up sentences to the pictures? (pause) For example, was there any regularity or consistency about the kind of sentences you made up to either of the two pictures? (6) Was there any similarity in the way you made up sentences to the pictures and the way you made them up to words on the index cards?
(c) Was there any regularity or consistency in the way you made up sentences to the index cards ?
(d) From the start to the finish of each sentence, tell me step by step how you went about making up sentences to the words on the index cards.
(e) [If there has not yet been any acknowledgment of the use of "he" and "they":] Well, one of the things you haven't mentioned, perhaps because you didn't think it was important, is the fact that you started your sentences with "he" and "they," (pause) Hmm? (pause) Do you recall now? [Regardless of answer:] I'm wondering why you didn't mention the use of "he" and "they." Several possibilities occur to me. One is that you couldn't remember the words, another is that you could remember the words but you didn't think you were supposed to mention them, and still a third is that you just didn't think it was important. Which of these three alternatives sounds the closest to the way you felt?
The questions up to this point were concerned with eliciting information about posthypnotic amnesia. In order to be counted as amnesic, a subject had to say nothing about the use of "he" and "they" through Question d, and in response to Question e, say that she could not remember using the words.
The following questions were concerned with the ability of a subject to justify her behavior and were asked only if the subject immediately acknowledged or ultimately recognized her prior use of "he" and "they." (/) At the time you were actually doing the task did you realize that you were starting all your sentences with "he" and "they"? [If "yes," Experimenter 3 went on to Question g; if "no," then /i was asked.] (/i) When you say "no" to this question, it's possible to mean one of two things. One possibility is that even though you knew you were using "he" and "they" it was really very natural and easy to do this, and therefore you simply didn't have to think much about it as you went along. The second possibility is that you really didn't have the slightest idea that you were starting your sentences with "he" and "they." If this were the case, you were probably very surprised to discover that this was what you had done. Which of these possibilities seems closer to the truth, the first one or the second one? [If the subject replied with the former, it counted the same as if she had said "yes" to question /. If the subject replied with the latter, no further questions were asked.] (g) If you were aware of using "he" and "they," did you realize at the time why you were using the words?
(h) At the time did you use the words involuntarily or voluntarily? And by voluntarily I mean did you use them on purpose because you knew you were supposed to, that is, because they had been designated as correct for this experiment?
The subjects were said to justify their behavior only if they claimed that their use of "he" and "they" was voluntary in response to question h. The subjects were said not to justify their behavior who replied to question h that they had responded involuntarily, or who were never asked this question because of its irrelevancy in light of previous answers. It was assumed that only simulating subjects would justify their behavior and the validity of this assumption was tested by seeing whether hypnotic subjects and simulating subjects could be accurately identified on the basis of this criterion.
After Experimenter 3 completed his interview, he left the office and Experimenter 1 returned. If the subject was a simulating subject, Experimenter 1 thanked her for helping Experimenter 3, and admonished her to say nothing about what had happened during the final session. If the subject was an hypnotic subject, Experimenter 1 rehypnotized her, removed the suggestion to begin sentences with "he" and "they," and awakened her. Neither hypnotic subjects nor simulating subjects were ever told the actual purpose of the experiment at this time. This precaution was taken to minimize the importance of any information leaks that might occur despite Experimenter 1's plea for silence.
RESULTS
There was no significant difference in the hypnotic subjects' and the simulating subjects' tendency to use "they" and "he" on the Taffel task nor was there any significant difference in the frequency with which hypnotic subjects and simulating subjects used the "correct" pronouns to begin sentences to the MAPS pictures.
Although the effect of hypnosis did not produce significant differences on a task explicitly defined as experimental, there were quite striking differences in the "postexperimental" reports of hypnotic subjects and simulating subjects. Before reporting the actual findings, however, a word should be interjected about how the subjects' reports were classified. It might seem that the explicitness of the criteria for amnesia and justification would disallow any equivocation in judging their occurrence for any given subject. Indeed, this was the case for the vast majority of the subjects. However, a small minority of subjects responded in such a way that made it difficult to ascertain unequivocally whether or not they fell into one response category or another. This occasional ambiguity occurred for both the dimensions of amnesia and justification. In order to arbitrate this matter, two independent judges assessed all of the tape-recorded responses. The data of the judge least favorable to the experimental hypotheses are reported below. In confirmation of Hypothesis I, there was a high relationship ( <j > -.62; p < .0005) between the hypnotic condition and the lack of verbalization of "he" and "they" during the "postexperimental" inquiry. All of the 13 simulating subjects verbalized the use of "he" and "they" at this time whereas 8 out of 14 hypnotic subjects did not. Subjects' use of "he" and "they" was agreed upon 89% of the time by the two judges. In confirmation of Hypothesis II, the use of justification as a criterion in discriminating hypnotic subjects succeeded 25 out of 27 times. All 13 simulating subjects justified their behavior; 12 out of 14 hypnotic subjects did not (onetailed x 2 = 20.05; p<.00005). Two independent raters agreed in their classification of justifiers versus nonjustifiers 92 % of the time.
Three possible objections might be raised about the present findings. First, it might be argued that Experimenter 1 was not naive about the condition of the subject and that this knowledge could have subtly and selectively affected the way he vocalized his closing speech (Rosenthal, 1964) . In an attempt to circumvent this criticism entirely, Experimenter 1 did not give the closing speech during early pilot work. Instead, Experimenter 3 announced the end of the experiment after ostensibly collecting data for Experimenter 1. Following this announcement, Experimenter 3 plied the subject with some "informal" questions of his own, the answers to which were utilized in making judgments concerning amnesia and justification. Now, the research program consisted of seeking and finding a procedure that would consistently elicit "remembering" and "justifying" behavior from simulating subjects and then to see how the identical procedures affected the hypnotic subjects. Unfortunately, under these initial pilot conditions, simulating subjects did not "confess" even though they were convinced the experiment was over. Their rationale for continued withholding was a belief that only the hypnotist could release really hypnotized subjects from previous suggestions by announcing the end of the experiment. The effect of these confounding expectancies obviously had to be eliminated for both hypnotic subjects and simulating subjects, so Experimenter 1 thenceforth announced the experiment's finale.
In lieu of obviating completely the possibility that Experimenter 1 would convey differential treatment effects through subtle and confounding vocal cues, it was possible to test for their existence. The 27 repetitions of Experimenter 1's closing speech were taperecorded and four independent judges 5 were asked to judge from these recordings whether Experimenter 1 was talking to an hypnotic subject or a simulating subject on any given occasion. Three judges met with totally chance success in their judgments, but one "One senior psychologist, two advanced graduate students in clinical psychology, and one PhD in electrical engineering served as judges.
judge did discriminate successfully (p < .05). When this judge was asked what his rationale for categorizing subjects was, he replied that Experimenter 1 seemed more convincing and persuasive with the hypnotic subjects! If this were in fact true, that is, if his success were not simply improbable, it seems plausible that hypnotic subjects would have been more prone to "confess" than simulating subjects all other things being equal. In any event, it seems unreasonable to suppose that naive experimental subjects could have been consistently influenced by vocal cues the very presence of which were so unreliably assessed by sophisticated judges set to discriminate.
A second possible objection to the present findings concerns the possibility that the inquiry procedure might have aroused subjects' suspicions that the experiment was not over, and that this suspicion might in some way be used to explain the present results better than the independent variable. To check out this possibility, Experimenter 1 telephoned each subject after all the subjects had been seen for the last time. He asked, "By the time Experimenter 3 was actually asking you his questions, did you have any notion that in fact my experiment was not over?" Nine hypnotic subjects and six simulating subjects said "No," three hypnotic subjects and five simulating subjects said "Yes."
8 (Fisher exact probability test insignificant at .05 level). At least by their own account, the hypnotic subjects and simulating subjects did not differ significantly in their perception that Experimenter 3's questions constituted a postexperimental inquiry. It follows that insignificant differences in how the inquiry procedure was perceived could not account for the highly significant differences of hypnotic subjects' and simulating subjects' verbal reports to the inquiry.
A third objection that might possibly be levelled at the present experiment is this. Actually, there were two differences in the way the hypnotic subjects and the simulating subjects were treated: hypnotic subjects but not the simulating subjects received their suggestions while hypnotized; simulating sub-jects but not hypnotic subjects received special instructions to behave later as if they had been hypnotized when they received the subsequent suggestions. Since there were two differences in the way the groups were treated, any significant results could as easily be attributed to instructional differences as to hypnosis. This is a logical argument, but not an entirely reasonable one when the purpose of the simulating instructions is clarified. If these instructions had been deleted, then some of the simulating subjects would have been apt to make wrong assumptions about how they were to behave. For example, it would be quite plausible for a simulating subject, unprepared by simulating instructions, to assume that subsequent hypnotic suggestions were not supposed to "take" simply because both he and the hypnotist knew he was not hypnotized upon receipt of the suggestions. Such an assumption by a simulating subject could be expected to lead to obviously nonhypnotic behavior. The explicitness of simulating instructions thus served to maximize the likelihood of all simulating subjects behaving hypnotically insofar as this behavior is determined by the experimental demand characteristics. The purpose of maximizing this source of hypnotic behavior in simulating subjects was to minimize the differences between the two groups insofar as this difference might be a function of the hypnotic subjects' sensitivity to the demand characteristics (Fisher, 1954) . In short, the function of the simulating instructions was to enhance the likelihood of accepting the null hypothesis if in fact hypnotic behavior were nothing but responsiveness to demand characteristics. Therefore, any significant differences between groups that did appear seem to be the result of something other than simulating instructions, namely, the presence of the trance variable in hypnotic subjects only.
It must be admitted that the above line of thinking is only reasonable, and that the merely reasonable can occasionally be as misleading as the merely logical. For example, it might be true that demand characteristics for hypnotic subjects were totally different from those of the simulating subjects simply because the hypnotic subjects knew or believed themselves to be hypnotized and the simulating subjects knew that they were not. This is a somewhat vexing possibility not easily accessible to experimental control. Barber and Calverley (1964b) suggest that a slight variation of this possibility is the case, but their conclusions in this and similar experiments are suspect due to faulty methods described below. Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that such belief or knowledge is not a crucial demand variable in hypnosis. Occasionally, one hypnotizes a highly susceptible subject who afterwards claims (oftentimes with some vehemence) that he knew at the time and knows now that he in fact was not hypnotized. This claim typically does not square with the clinical facts, for example, unacknowledged and spontaneous posthypnotic amnesia. Evidently in these cases it is not the demand characteristics supplied by the knowledge or belief of being hypnotized that eventuates in hypnotic behavior. DISCUSSION Inasmuch as differences due to experimental demand characteristics were minimized, the results of the present investigation seem to constitute one of the more convincing experimental demonstrations of the "altered state" theory of hypnosis. The success in this regard was made possible in part by avoiding a methodological pitfall common to investigations which have concluded or implied that the concept of an hypnotic state is expendable. The flaw that has prompted this conclusion is simply stated as follows: typically, the experimenter provided too much information in the initial (hypnotic, simulating, task motivating, etc.) suggestions about what kind of (dependent variable) behavior was expected. If, for example, both hypnotized subjects and task-motivated (simulating) control subjects are told they are to see an (hallucinatory) cat on their laps or hear Jingle Bells played on an imaginary phonograph (Barber & Calverley, 1964a) then both groups of subjects have a good idea of what is expected of them: they are supposed to say that they saw a cat and heard the song. Given the admission of hallucinations by both hypnotic and task-motivated subjects, it is impossible to know if the hypnotic subjects are simply responding to the demand characteristics as the control subjects are, or if they so respond because they "see" and "hear" the suggested phenomenon as a function of having received these suggestions in a hypnotic trance.
Barber and his co-workers are particularly vulnerable to this criticism. He has presented data from many experiments all of which lead him to conclude that simply giving direct suggestions to waking, task-motivated subjects is sufficient to elicit behavior that cannot be differentiated from "hypnotic" behavior. If this were all he concluded, there would be little to disagree with. However, he further implies that since hypnotic subjects do not behave differently from task-motivated controls, the basis of their behavior must be similar. This does not seem to be a legitimate conclusion.
It is very important to be clear about this. A person can voluntarily perform a tic that to all appearances is indistinguishable from an involuntary, nervous tic. The behavior is the same; the basis of the behavior quite obviously is not. The actual differences underlying these two kinds of tic behavior are of paramount theoretical and practical importance, for example, the unconscious as opposed to conscious origins of the nervous tic, the implications this has for treatment, and so on. Equally important issues are at stake in the experimental study of hypnosis. Consequently, insofar as one is grappling with questions about the nature of hypnosis, there is a point of diminishing returns implied by the exclusive use of paradigm that tends, by its very nature, to emphasize the similarities between real and simulated (or taskmotivated) hypnotic behavior rather than to clarify the nature of the differences underlying them. That hypnotic and control subjects do behave similarly is certainly a valuable finding, particularly when it is not an expectable result on strictly a priori grounds. The question remains, however, whether or not the similarity in behavior reflects a similarity in the basis of behavior.
There seem to be at least three competing answers to the question of why hypnotic subjects and their controls do in fact behave similarly: (a) the control subjects are somehow hypnotized by virtue of having received their suggestions in a motivated state (a possibility that seems almost too remote to consider); (b) hypnotic subjects are merely task motivated and/or responsive to the experimental demand characteristics (a possibility that Barber seems to favor); (c) control subjects simply respond in a more or less purposeful manner to the task demands, whereas the hypnotic subjects' behavior is determined both by demand variables and by state or trance variables.
7 The present investigation seems rather unequivocally to confirm this last alternative. Previous investigations, however, utilizing the usual hypnotic-simulator paradigm have not really legitimized a choice among these options. Their strategy has generally consisted solely of proving the null hypothesis that hypnotic and simulator subjects can behave similarly. But no matter how many times this same paradigm is used to "prove" the null hypothesis of behavior equivalence, it will never suffice to accept or reject the null hypothesis concerning the underlying bases of similar behavior. To maintain contrariwise, that is, to conclude that because behavioral manifestations of hypnotic and simulating subjects are similar, the behavioral substrate must be, is a little like saying that the person who voluntarily performs a tic must be as neurotic as the genuine tiqueur.
The present investigation suggests that earlier studies showing no difference between hypnotic subjects and their controls did so for a very good reason: they compared groups in terms of behavior that was entirely 7 These alternatives are not necessarily exhaustive. Indeed, much of the literature on social persuasion and conformity behavior seems pertinent to Barber's methods. Oftentimes, for example, Barber presents what amounts to false norms to his task-motivated controls, telling them, for instance, that so far everyone who has really tried to see a cat on their lap has been able to do so. A subject's subsequent admission that he indeed did see a cat bears a certain resemblance to the behavior of subjects in an Asch type experiment whose responses on a variety of judgment tasks are altered greatly by the influence of false norms (Crutchfield, I9SS). It has been shown by factor analysis that this general kind of responsiveness to social norms bears little or no relation to hypnotic susceptibility (Moore, 1964) . explicable on the basis of demand characteristics alone, thereby minimizing the possibility of isolating any special effects the hypnotic state may have had. Whether hypnotic subjects behaved the way they did simply as a response to demand variables or whether for uniquely hypnotic reasons could not, therefore, be determined.
The present study obviated this interpretive dilemma by making critical alterations in the hypnotic-simulator paradigm usually employed. In previous studies, the influence of trance and task demand variables has been in the same direction. This merger confounded their effects in a way that obscured any influence the trance variable may have possessed. In this study, therefore, the directions of influence of trance variables and subsequent demand variables were purposely antagonized, thereby allowing a legitimate inference from the dependent variable behavior concerning which of the variables was prepotent.
The following is a summary account of the revamped hypnotic-simulator paradigm as it was employed in this experiment. Neither the hypnotic subjects nor the simulating subjects received any specific information about how to behave after the announced conclusion of the experiment. Thus, demand characteristics inherent in the initial suggestions, and specific to the dependent variable behavior were minimized. The subsequent termination of the experiment, together with a directive to be honest despite previous suggestions' altered the situation for the simulating subjects so that it became all right for them to "confess. 1 -The fact that an identical alteration in the demand characteristics did not similarly affect the hypnotic subjects is, of course, the critical finding of this investigation. The effects of receiving suggestions under hypnosis evidently take precedence over subsequent, countermanding alterations in the demand characteristics. It is reasonable to conclude that hypnotic behavior is not wholly reducible to acting in accordance with demand characteristics, and that hypnosis seems in part to be an altered state within which suggestions have a peculiarly potent effect.
